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Legal Research
Whatever Happened to 1845?
The Missing Decisions
Of the Texas Supreme Court
By Jim Paulsen, Briefing Attorney, Texas Supreme Court
And James Hambleton, Director, State Law Library
Have you ever noticed a gap in the
publication of Texas Supreme Court
decisions? Both the Harvard "Blue
Book" and the University of Texas
"Green Book" inform readers that
opinions of the court from 1840 to
1844 (the Republic period) can be
found in Dallam's Decisions, while
decisions from 1846 on (statehood)
are available in Texas Reports or the
Southwestern Reporter. That's all
very clear, but whatever happened
to 1845? This article will supply half
an answer to this question; perhaps
some reader can provide the other
half.
At the outset, a little historical
background is in order. The Texas
Supreme Court in 1845 operated in a
much different way than it does
today. There were seven judges in
all, with John Hemphill presiding as
chief justice. Six of the judges -
John B. Jones, William J. Jones,
William E. Jones, R.E.B. Baylor (the
Judge Baylor, of Baylor University),
R.T. Wheeler and M.P. Norton -
served double duty as district
judges.
For most of the year, these district
judges heard cases in the counties of
their respective districts. Then, for
about three weeks, they would meet
with Chief Justice Hemphill as a
supreme court to hear appeals, with
the judge who sat at trial not par-
830 Texas Bar Journal July1985
ticipating in the decision.
Unfortunately, the court had no
official reporter to publish the deci-
sions. Until 1845, Texas attorneys
simply learned about Texas
Supreme Court cases from news-
paper accounts or by word of
mouth. Then James Wilmer Dallam,
an enterprising young lawyer from
Matagorda, stepped in.
In the spring of 1845, Dallam
traveled to Philadelphia to oversee
the publication of a digest of
Republic statutes. He included at the
end of this volume the opinions of
the Supreme Court for the terms up
to that point (1840-44). Since later
reprints followed the original pagi-
nation, the first reported Texas case
appears as "Dallam 357."
Although Dallarn's Decisions is
often bound with a red and gold
"Texas Reports" on its spine (and is
sometimes listed as "Volume 0") it
does not enjoy the "official" status
of the real Texas Reports. The Texas
Reports were authorized by the first
state Legislature in 1846, but Vol-
ume 1 was not printed until 1848.
The delay, according to the first
reporters, James Webb and Thomas
H. Duval, was caused by considera-
tions of state pride that led them to
reject faster and cheaper printing by
Yankees in favor of authentic Texas
ink.
The Supreme Court of the
Republic of Texas was scheduled to
meet in December of 1845. Yet,
amid all the confusion surrounding
imminent statehood, there was
some uncertainty about even this
fact. The Telegraph and Texas Reg-
ister, a Houston newspaper,
reported: "Several of our contempo-
raries have expressed the opinion
that little or no business would be
transacted by the Supreme Court
owing to the expiration of the term
of service of the chief justice and one
of the associate judges previous to
the meeting of the court. This how-
ever is an error; the term of service
of the chief justice and the senior
judge does not expire until the 25th
of January [1846]."
Some people also hoped that the
Supreme Court of the Republic
would not meet. Royal T. Wheeler
wrote to a fellow attorney, Oran M.
Roberts (later a chief justice), in
November 1845: "1 suspect that Ch.
J. has at length concocted some
learned opinions with which he is
pregnant and which he is desirous to
promulgate before the expiration of
the Republic. ... The bar south and
west entertain a very moderate
respect for Judge Hemphill and are
extremely averse to see him retained
upon the bench." The irony of this
letter is that not only was Justice
Hemphill retained as the first chief
justice of the state, but Royal T.
Wheeler became one of the first
associate justices.
With this historical foundation
laid, three questions arise. The first,
and simplest: Are there any 1845
opinions? The answer is "Yes." The
Supreme Court of the Republic of
Texas met in December of 1845, had
a perfectly ordinary session, wrote
more than 30 opinions, and
adjourned on Jan. 5, 1846, to re-
convene in the fall as the Supreme
Court of the State of Texas.
That was the easy question. The
second one is harder. Why weren't
the opinions printed? Any number
of possible reasons come to mind.
Perhaps they were not considered
authoritative once Texas statehood
was declared, although decisions of
the Republic have often since been
quoted. Perhaps they were just for-
gotten, although William Alex-
ander's Texas Digest in 1854
carefully includes some of the man-
uscript decisions of 1845 among the
state and Republic decisions
digested. Paschal's 1875 Digest of
Decisions also pirated some of Alex-
ander's notes, but references to 1845
cases seem to die out thereafter.
The most likely reason the deci-
sions were never printed is much
more mundane. With no authoriza-
tion or funding for an official
reporter before 1845, and with the
official Texas Reports authorized in
1846, there was probably just no
profit to be made from printing this
one relatively small batch of opin-
ions, to fill the gap between
Dallam's Decisions and Volume I of
the Texas Reports. After enough
years, most people probably just
forgot that the decisions ever
existed. Whatever the reason, it is
undisputed that these opinions
never made it into print.
The last question is the hardest:
Where are the 1845 decisions today?
It appears that opinions at this time
were initially written in longhand by
the judges or their clerks, then cop-
ied by the court clerk into a bound
opinion book. This book is pre-
served in the State Archives, and
does contain the full text, sometimes
faint and faded, of 16 opinions.
Court minutes, though, show that
more than 30 opinions were actually
written. The opinion book contains
the beginning of the seventeenth
case, but trails off in mid-sentence,
with a hundred or so blank pages left
in the book. The opinions were evi-
dently preserved somewhere,
because Alexander was able to
digest them some 10 years later. Per-
haps the original opinions remained
somewhere in the appellate record
or other Supreme Court documents.
In 1975, though, virtually all case
files of the Republic period were
illegally removed and presumably
sold to autograph collectors and
antiquarians.
As we said at the beginning, this
article provides only half an answer
to the question of what happened to
the missing year of the Texas
Supreme Court. Efforts are under-
way to arrange publication of all
available opinions as a Texas Ses-
quicentennial project. If any reader
has an idea or suggestion as to where
the remaining opinions might be
found, information would be grate-
fully received by James Hambleton,
Director, State Law Library, Box
12367, Capitol Station, Austin
78711. Naturally, any confidences
will be respected. A list of the miss-
ing opinions follows:
No. 144. William M. Cook v.
Edward Hall. From Harris
County, opinion by Judge
Wheeler.
No. 354. Jose Antonio de la Garza
v. John Twohig. From Bexar
County, opinion by Judge John
B. Jones.
No. 331. Thomas Duggan v. James
Cole. From Travis County, opin-
ion by Judge John B. Jones.
No. 305. Samuel M. Frost v. Ann L.
Frost. From Harris County,
opinion by Judge Baylor.
No. 261. Jesse Holderman v. Russell
B. Craft. From Bastrop County,
opinion by Judge William E.
Jones.
No. ???. Thomas M. League v.
Samuel Whiting. From Harris
County, opinion by Judge
William E. Jones.
No. 190. N.H. Monger v. James B.
Allen and Elizabeth Allen. From
Austin County, opinion by Judge
Norton.
No. 255. Heirs of Naham Nixon v.
Republic of Texas. From Colo-
rado County, opinion by Chief
Justice Hemphill.
No. 245. Hugh Nunn v. Republic of
Texas. From Liberty County,
opinion by Judge John B. Jones.
No. 341. Republic of Texas v.
William Gammell. From Bastrop
County, opinion by Judge
William E. Jones.
No. 135. Republic of Texas v.
David S. Harbert. From Bastrop
County, opinion by Chief Justice
Hemphill.
No. 370. E.A. Rhoades v. J.A.
Wheeler. From Victoria County,
opinion by Judge Baylor.
No. 347. Sinks, Vail & Co. v.
Republic of Texas. From Bastrop
County, opinion by Chief Justice
Hemphill.
No. 187. Townsend & Haywood v.
Whiting. From Harris County,
writer of opinion unknown.
No. 369. Samuel M. Wingate v.
Republic of Texas. Opinion by
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More Than A Snooze
Worried clients, anxious clients, lots of clients (at any and all hours of
the day and night), partners, adjusters, deposition reports, memos, juries
(who obviously do not hear closing arguments as well as they should),
briefs, deadlines ... your blood pressure is boiling ... no apparent relief in
sight ... and the dog days of summer are just beginning.
Boy, if your law practice is anything like mine, the last few months have
been anything but relaxing.
Gotta lower that diastolic, systolic ... NOW ... gotta relax. Exercise?
David Seidler Aerobics? Isometrics? Lamaze? (just focus on that framed law degree and
systematically breathe deeply) Golf? (Naw, that is worse than the office -
how could I leave that ball in the sand trap three times in a row?) Tennis? (Nope - no one should ever
double fault the set away).
All these activities occasionally relax a bone-tired lawyer - but more often, they don't.
I have discovered one daily activity that rarely fails to relax: HAMMOCKING!
The indians in South America started it all. When Columbus dropped anchor in the Bahamas in
1492, he found the locals sleeping in hanging beds woven from strips made from the bark of the hamack
tree. The indians called their beds "hamacas." The idea was taken back to Spain, and soon, the French,
the British and the Spanish sailors used these contraptions to relax and sleep while on long voyages.
In the early 1880's, hammocks in the United States were still a novelty. Most were narrow and
demanded great athletic ability to stay on board. Thanks to wider versions, hammocks became
popular in the 1800's and have remained so.
Swaying vigorously, one can mentally cope with worries left over from the office. It might take four
or nine, but in no more than 111/2 minutes the vigorous swaying subsides and while lying perfectly still,
floating in a pristine, relaxing silence, the worries disappear.
For those of you not mechanically inclined, I offer these tips to sling your hammock:
INDOORS: Take care to drill into wood studs or beams (nothing breaks a relaxing snooze like a
collapsed hammock).
OUTDOORS: Trees (or if you live in Amarillo, Lubbock, Midland/Odessa or almost anywhere else
in West Texas, 10-foot 4x4 posts make great substitutes; use guy-wires for strength) and porch columns
are perfect.
Adjust the hammock so it drapes deeply (no more than two feet off the ground). For safety's sake,
keep the area under the hammock clear and test the hammock for strength.
Now, after a full day of doing all the things that lawyers have to do, lie back in your full-length silent
rocking chair and read, watch television, talk to your kids, chat with your wife, snooze or just day-
dream - Relax.
Your family, your partners, your clients and even you will hardly recognize the rejuvenated, relaxed
lawyer who shows up at the dinner table each evening and behind the desk each morning.
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Loss of Consortium and
Con trib u tory Negligence:
What's the Rule?
By Greg Thompson and Kurt Chacon
Claims for loss of consortium are being advanced at an
ever increasing pace since the 1978 Texas Supreme Court
decision in Whittlesey v. Miller.1 By this decision the
court recognized a cause of action in Texas for loss of
consortium and disapproved any previous holdings to
the contrary. 2 In recognizing a cause of action for loss of
consortium, the court brought Texas into the majority of
states which have recognized that doctrine.3 However,
the recognition of a cause of action for consortium has
raised the attendant problem of whether or not to reduce
or exclude such an award based upon any negligence on
the part of the injured spouse. This article focuses on the
approach that other jurisdictions have adopted as well as
that approach which Texas should adopt.
With the advent of Duncan v. Cessna,4 and the
application of pure comparative causation to strict lia-
bility, this problem will be occurring with increasing
frequency. Consortium has been defined to include the
mutual right of the husband and wife to that affection,
solace, comfort, companionship, society, assistance, and
sexual relations necessary to a successful marriage.5 The
definition primarily consists of the intangible elements of
a marriage. Whenever any of these elements have been
substantially interfered with, a cause of action for loss of
consortium accrues. Whether or not a loss of consortium
award should be reduced or excluded on the basis of the
injured spouse's negligence depends upon the very nature
of the consortium cause of action. If the cause of action
for loss of consortium derives from the cause of action of
the injured spouse, it follows that any consortium award
be reduced by the contributory negligence attributed to
the injured spouse. If, however, the consortium action is
considered separate and independent from the injured
spouse's cause of action, then any contributory negli-
gence of the injured spouse has no effect on the consor-
tium recovery.
In addressing the independent/derivative dichotomy,
the Supreme Court in Whittlesey stated:
Finally, while the deprived spouse's suit for loss of
consortium is considered to be derivative of the
impaired spouse's negligence action to the extent
that the tortfeasor's liability to the impaired spouse
must be established, the consortium action is, nev-
ertheless, independent and apart from that of the
impaired spouse's negligence action.
6
The court's holding is ambiguous with respect to the
actual independence of the cause of action. 7 One inter-
pretation is that the Supreme Court held once liability is
established with respect to the injured spouse, then the
consortium action is independent from the impaired
spouse's negligence action. Another reasonable inter-
pretation is that the negligent actor is liable to the
impaired spouse only to the extent he is liable to the
injured spouse.
Although this fact situation has not been squarely
confronted by the Texas courts, the ambiguous language
was discussed in Reed Tool Company v. Copelin.8 In
Copelin, the primary issue was whether a wife's cause of
action for loss of consortium against her injured hus-
band's employer was barred by the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation act. The Copelin Court in reviewing
Whittlesey determined that a consortium cause of action
was derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action. In
so holding the court stated:
We therefore hold that Judy Copelin's suit is deriv-
ative and that a defense that tends to constrict or
exclude the tortfeasor's liability to the injured hus-
band will have the same effect on the wife's consor-
tium action. 9
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The court went on to hold that negligent impairment of
consortium would be barred but that intentional impair-
ment would not be. Although Copelin dealt with the
Workers' Compensation Act's effect on a consortium
award, the Supreme Court issued a sweeping pronounce-
ment seeming to apply the rationale to any defense that
may "constrict or exclude the tortfeasor's liability." The
defense of contributory or comparative negligence could
be subsumed in that category. Therefore, although there
are no Texas cases on point, a broad reading of Copelin
might suggest that if the injured spouse is found to be
contributorily negligent, that finding will serve to reduce
or bar the recovery for loss of consortium.
Such a broad reading of Copelin, however, would be
misplaced. Such an interpretation greatly overstates
Whittlesey's holding and unreasonably limits an
impaired spouse's cause of action for their independent
injury. Although the Texas Supreme Court in Whittlesey
held that the cause of action for loss of consortium is
derivative to the extent liability to the injured spouse is
established, that determination did not preordain that
any defense that limits or excludes liability to the injured
spouse would do likewise to the impaired spouse. Neither
the Whittlesey nor the Copelin court defined what it
meant by the term "derivative cause of action."
Black's Law Dictionary defines "derivative" as coming
from another; that which has not its origin in itself, but
owes its existence to something foregoing. 10 As to the
definition of a derivative action, Black's states that they
are actions based upon the primary right of a corpora-
tion, asserted by a stockholder because of a corporation's
failure to act upon the primary right."
Loss of consortium is not derivative in the same man-
ner. To be sure, the impaired spouse's action is dependent
upon the injury to the other spouse; however, unlike a
shareholder derivative suit, the impaired spouse actually
suffers an original injury. The impaired spouse has a
separate right that can be enforced in a separate action. It
is the injury rather than the claim that is derivative. Since
this is so, the rights of the impaired spouse should not be
contingent upon the rights of the disabled spouse. 12
The doctrine of imputed negligence among husband
and wife has been abolished in Texas. In Graham v.
Franco13 and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Thomas,14 the court held that a husband's contributory
negligence could not be imputed to bar his wife's separate
property recovery for her personal injuries. In doing this,
Texas thrust itself in the majority of states by finding that
applying the concept of imputed contributory negligence
would frustrate the theoretical underpinnings of Texas
tort law. It has the effect of freeing from liability a party
at fault even though the injured party is totally
blameless.15
The dicta in Copelin, which some might read to indi-
cate that it would reduce or exclude a consortium award
based upon the negligence of an injured spouse, resur-
rects the doctrine of imputed negligence in another
form. 1 6 The case law and commentator's criticism of
imputed negligence is equally valid when pertaining to
the problem of reducing consortium awards based on
contributory negligence of the injured spouse. To do so is
to penalize a totally innocent plaintiff in favor of a negli-
gent tortfeasor.
The Copelin court distinguishes in a footnote Graham
v. Southwestern Bell by stating that the cause of action at
issue there was not derivative as was the cause of action
for loss of consortium. 17 The court did not address the
underlying policy reasons for doing away with the doc-
trine of imputed negligence. The court failed to realize
those policy reasons applied equally to a loss of consor-
tium case as to a separate spousal injury case. As stated
previously, although the injury may be derivative, the
claim is independent. As such the loss of consortium
award should not be reduced or excluded on the basis of
the injured spouse's negligence.
Other jurisdictions have recognized this distinction
and allowed the impaired spouse a full recovery of all
damages from the defendant. In Feltch v. General Rental
Co., 18 the Massachusetts Supreme Court was presented
the question of whether or not the impaired spouse's
recovery for loss of consortium should be reduced by the
injured spouse's comparative negligence. The court
began its inquiry by examining the historical basis for the
derivative action theory, as the theory views husband
and wife as a single unit. Prior Massachusetts cases had
rejected the derivative rule and adopted the independent
cause of action theory in loss of consortium action. 19 The
analysis is predicted on the "...nature of the claims, not
the source of the injury..."20
After reaffirming adherence to the independent the-
ory, the court then turned to the comparative negligence
statute to determine the application of the theory to the
facts. The court stated:
... the statute does not indicate that her recovery
(impaired spouse) should be reduced by the degree
of her husband's negligence ... Any change in the
legislative policy as expressed in the statute is for
the legislature ... (parenthetical added).
21
The court felt a contrary rule would simply impute negli-
gence from one family member to another.
The last issue decided in Feltch was the propriety of the
defendant's cross-action for contribution against the hus-
band for the amount of the husband's comparative negli-
gence as it pertained to the impaired wife's claim. The
court summarily rejected this approach, as it would sanc-
tion imputed negligence in another form, and has the
effect of reducing the impaired spouse's claim due to the
injured spouse's negligence. 22
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The first Circuit Court of Appeals decided a similar
question in Macon v. Seaward Construction Co., 23
applying New Hampshire law. While acknowledging
that jurisdictions previously deciding this issue reduced
or limited the impaired spouse's negligence, the court
concluded New Hampshire law viewed loss of consor-
tium as an independent cause of action. The court then
stated that the comparative negligence statute of New
Hampshire did not insure that a tortfeasor would never
be required to pay a greater proportion of his damages
than his percentage of comparative fault.24 The statute
provided that a plaintiff's recovery be reduced only by
the degree of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, and
in the instant case, the impaired spouse was not at fault.
The court was bound by the wording of the New
Hampshire comparative fault statute not unlike the
Feltch v. General Rental Co. court. The significant dif-
ference between the two opinions is the Macon court did
not offer any real analysis of the nature of the consortium
action and did not reach the result with much assurance
interpreting New Hampshire law. 2'
In Lantis v. Condon,26 the California First Court of
Appeals faced the question whether or not to limit an
impaired spouse's recovery by the percentage of com-
parative negligence of the injured spouse. The court first
established that the defense of imputed contributory neg-
ligence was abolished by statute. The court rejected the
distinction that this statute was intended to operate only
when the contributory negligence of the injured spouse
was a complete bar to recovery. The court found no
significance in the argument that the impaired spouse's
claim would not be barred but rather limited by the
injured spouse's negligence. 27
Having dismissed the imputed negligence argument,
the court then decided the issue of whether the loss of
consortium was a derivative or independent cause of
action. The court acknowledged Nelson v. Busby 28 and
White v. Lunder29 as the leading cases supporting the
derivative theory and offered the following analysis:
The basis for the theory appears to be that the
wife's cause of action is so inextricably linked to
the marital relation that there is in reality only one
cognizable injury. Another way of explaining ...
this is to picture the cause of action as being in the
nature as an assignment from the injured spouse to
his partner. We find this description neither per-
suasive nor logical ...30
The court held that the loss of consortium action is
separate and distinct and is comprised of the spouse's
own "physical, psychological and emotional pain and
anguish" resulting from the injury to the other spouse as
it affects the "love, affection, companionship, comfort
and sexual relations concomitant with normal married
life."31
The defendant presented the argument that the loss of
consortium action was akin to a wrongful death action
where comparative negligence is a limitation on recov-
ery, and the court rejected this theory on the basis of the
express wording of the California wrongful death statute
providing for such a defense. 32 The court also considered
how the California comparative negligence statute
affected the issues raised in the case. The California
statute speaks only in terms of the negligence of the
plaintiff and defendant, and embodies the principals that
(1) one whose negligence causes harm to another should
be liable, and (2) one whose negligence contributes to
his/her own injury should not cast the burden of liability
upon another. The impaired spouse is, as a rule, an
innocent third party, and allowing any party to escape
liability for the spouse's injuries is simply imputed negli-
gence, a doctrine rejected by the California law. 3 3
The court discussed the possibility that this system
might allow the injured spouse to indirectly profit from
his/her own negligence, but the Legislature had spoken
on that issue as well. By abolishing imputed negligence as
a defense, the Legislature chose to allow a contributorily
negligent spouse to indirectly profit in this situation as
opposed to allowing a negligent defendant to escape
liability for injuries to a plaintiff who was totally free
from fault - whether under contributory or com-
parative negligence. 34 The court briefly discussed the
836 Texas BarJournal July1985
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possibility of a counterclaim by the defendant against the
injured spouse for contribution, but passed no judgment
on this policy.
There are several cases often cited as contra authority.
In Maidman v. Stagg,35 the question raised on appeal
was whether or not the negligence of the injured spouse
proportionately reduced the impaired spouse's recovery
for loss of consortium. The New York court held that the
claim was derivative and that any recovery by the
impaired spouse shall be reduced by any percentage of
negligence of the injured spouse, 36 based on previous
New York decisions holding loss of consortium a deriva-
tive action arising from the injured spouse's action for
injuries.
In discussing case law contrary to the decision
announced in the opinion, the court stated that in none of
these decisions:
.. did the courts suggest that their rejection of the
majority rule was mandated by the adoption of
comparative negligence. Rather, those courts
relied on a scholarly criticism of the rule, which
was written before the widespread adoption of
comparative negligence ... 37
Thus, the court implies that criticism of the derivative
concept was based on fairness - that is, an innocent
spouse should not be totally barred from recovery. This
rationale does not address the underlying nature of the
claim and, further, does not address the real effect this
doctrine has on the innocent spouse.
A similar result was reached in Eggert v. Working.
38
The Alaska Supreme Court held a reduction of the
impaired spouse recovery proper under Alaska law.
39
Alaska previously adopted by way of judicial decision a
comparative negligence system. 40 The court noted that
prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, contrib-
utory negligence of the injured spouse barred any consor-
tium recovery by the impaired spouse, and further
stated:
... it seems entirely logical to apply the partial
defense of comparative negligence to such a claim
41
The court in Eggert relied on the rationale of com-
parative negligence, that is, each tortfeasor should bear
their respective portion of fault. While the court admit-
ted this result was not technically achieved, 42 it harmo-
nized this inconsistency by pointing out that the
plaintiff/spouses "... were in effect, if not in law, a single
economic unit...,43 This may or may not be true in every
case, and the economic unit analysis does not address the
fundamental question of the impaired spouse's innocence
or the independent nature of the claim.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin faced a similar yet
unique situation in White v. Lunder,44 with the jury
apportioning fault between both spouses and the defen-
dant. 45 The impaired spouse sued for medical expenses
incurred on behalf of the injured spouse and for loss of
consortium. The court discussed prior Wisconsin law
and concluded that the cause of action for loss of consor-
tium was derivative. 46 The court admitted that deeming
the action derivative for the purposes of applying the
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute4 7 "... might
not be entirely logical ... but ... does little violence to the
prior expressions of this court ..."48 The court felt it was
unjust to allow the defendant to escape liability when he
was more negligent than any other party, but felt it
equally unjust to allow the husband (impaired spouse) a
recovery disregarding his causal negligence or that of his
wife (injured spouse). 49 The court allowed a recovery by
the husband for loss of consortium and medical expenses
for the proportion of negligence attributable to the defen-
dant,50 based on the comparative negligence statute
allowing recovery so long as the negligence of the person
seeking recovery was not greater than that from whom
recovery is sought.5
This holding is inconsistent with the derivative action
theory. Under the facts of the case, the combined negli-
gence of the spouses was greater than that of the defen-
dant, but the defendant was not able to avail himself of
the comparative negligence defense. This opinion is bet-
ter explained on the basis of the finding of negligence of
the impaired spouse and the court's reluctance to allow
the impaired/negligent spouse a full recovery. The opin-
ion does not focus on the nature of the claim or the
problem of imputed negligence.
Another often cited case was decided by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Nelson v. Busby.52 Arkansas had
previously adopted comparative negligence and the
court faced the issue of whether or not to reduce the
impaired spouse's recovery by the negligence of the
injured spouse. The court held, without discussion, that
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Arkansas law had already established a consortium
action as derivative. The court concluded that, due to
this derivative nature, the impaired spouse has no better
standing than rested in the injured spouse.53 This case
provides no discussion of any rationale or theory as to
why the consortium action is derivative. While this case
is properly cited for the conclusion it reaches, one can
hardly say the opinion is well-reasoned. It does not dis-
cuss the merits of the problem as it applies to an innocent
plaintiff in the scheme of comparative negligence.
Conclusion
These cases reflect obvioius differences in analyzing
the problem of the innocent spouse's claim for loss of
consortium in the scheme of contributory negligence.
The rationale offered in support of these holdings are
equally varied. The solutions to this problem, however,
can be narrowed to three: (1) allowing a reduction of the
tortfeasor's liability proportionate to the percentage of
negligence attributable to the injured spouse, (2) allow-
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tortfeasor, ignoring any negligence of the injured spouse,
and (3) allowing a full recovery by the impaired spouse
from the tortfeasor but also allowing a counterclaim by
the tortfeasor for contribution from the injured spouse.5 4
The third solution allowing a claim for contribution
against the negligent spouse is the most technically cor-
rect. However, courts considering this procedure found
this a sanction of imputed negligence in another form and
in Texas would be barred by the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity.55
We prefer a full and total recovery by the impaired
spouse, disregarding any negligence of the injured
spouse. The derivative action rationale relied upon to
reduce the impaired spouse's recovery does not address
the nature of the claim but rather the source of the injury.
It is, at best, a method of preventing unjust enrichment of
the negligent/injured spouse, 56 a doctrine rejected by
Texas courts. 57 Further, at least as to all non-pecuniary
losses, these recoveries would be the separate property of
the impaired spouse.5 8 The fact that the tortfeasor may
bear a disproportionate share of liability carries little
weight. Texas law in no way guarantees this fate will not
befall the defendant/tortfeasor.59 Texas courts should
adopt the sounder reasoning that the impaired spouse's
claim for loss of consortium is completely independent of
the injured spouse's claim for damages and protect the
innocent spouse's recovery from any reduction or limita-
tion.
1. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 668. See also Loss of Consortium: A Derivative
Injury Giving Rise to a Separate Cause of Action, 50
Fordham L. Rev. 1344, 1350 (1982).
4. 26 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 507 (July 16, 1983).
5. Whittlesey at 666.
6. Id. at 667.
7. As was stated in Whittlesey, it is probably the-
oretically more precise to refer to loss of consortium
as an element of damages rather than a cause of
action. However, as a practicality, it has come to be
referred to as a cause of action.
8. 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1980). Copelin II was recently
decided by the Texas Supreme Court. See Reed Tool
Company v. Copelin, 28 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 349 (April
10, 1985). The court held that an employer who
intentionally fails to maintain a safe work environ-
ment does not constitute an "intentional injury" that
would allow Mrs. Copelin to sue her husband's
employer.
9. Id. at 738-739.
10. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 399, 5th edition, 1979.
11. Id.
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12. See Footnote 3.
13. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
14. 554 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1977).
15. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §74,
Note 1, at 488.
16. See 50 Fordham L. Rev. 1344 (1980).
17. Copelin.
18. 421 N.E.2d 67 (Mass. 1981).
19. Id. at 71.
20. Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 71.
22. Id. at 71-72.
23. 555 F.2d i (1st Cir. 1977).
24. Id. at 2. See also Varela v. Petrofina, 658 S.W.2d
561, Tex.1983) and Duncan v. Cessna, 665 S.W.2d
414 (Tex.1983).
25. Id. at 2.
26. 95 Cal.App. 3d 153 (1979).
27. Id. at 156.
28. 437 S.W.2d 799 (Ark.1969) discussed infra.
29. 225 N.W.2d 442 (Wisconsin 1975), discussed infra.
30. Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal.App. 3d 153, 156 (1979).
31. Id. at 157.
32. Id. at 158. Since the statute provided that the
defenses against deceased are viable as against the
wrongful death claimants, the courts found this
analogy unpersuasive.
42. Id. at 1391. The injured spouse is not liable to the
impaired spouse.
43. Id. at 1391.
44. 225 N.W.2d 442 (Wisconsin 1975).
45. Id. at 1390. The jury apportioned fault as follows:
defendant 37 percent; injured spouse 30 percent;
impaired spouse 33 percent.
46. Id. at 449. Wisconsin law was unclear at that time on
this issue.
47. Sec. 895.045 Wisc. Stats.-1971 provides, in pertinent
part, "Contributory negligence ... shall not bar
recovery ... if such negligence is not greater than the
negligence against whom recovery is sought..." This
is sometimes referred to as a "not greater than" stat-
ute.
48. 225 N.W.2d 442, 449.
49. Id. at 449.
50. Id. at 449.
51. Id. at 449. A workable construction, consistent with
the statute, that will allow recovery in derivative
actions where the causal negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought is greater than
either the husband or wife can be accomplished by
reducing the entire award for both medical expenses
and loss of consortium by the percentage of negli-
gence attributed to the injured spouse (here Rose-
mary White's 30 percent); and further reducing the
entire award by the percentage of causal negligence
attributable to the claiming spouse (here Lloyd
White's 33 percent). By this method the person who
was found to have been causally negligent in greatest
degree cannot escape all liability but his liability is
decreased by an amount proportionate to the two
other tortfeasors.
52. 437 S.W.2d 799 (Ark.1969).
53. Id. at 803.
54. See Maidman v. Stagg, Fn. 18.
33. Id. at 159.
34. Id. at 160.
35. 441 N.Y.S.2d 711 (AppDiv 1981).
36. Id. at 713.
37. Id. at 715.
38. 599 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1979).
39. Id. at 1390.
40. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1307 (Alaska 1975).
41. 599 P.2d 1389, 1390.
55. Contribution exists only if the plaintiff would have a
right of action against the person from whom contri-
bution is sought. Paradissis v. Royal Indemnity Co.,
507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.1974).
56. See Footnotes 13, 14.
57. See Footnote 14.
58. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390.
59. See Footnote 24.
Liberty does not consist ... in mere declarations of the
rights of man. It consists in the translation of these decla-
rations into definite actions.
-Woodrow Wilson
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TYLA/Focus
1985-86 Officers Lead TYLA
"Attorneys should want to par-
ticipate in Texas Young Lawyers
Association and State Bar
activities," according to David
Seidler, 1985-86 president of TYLA.
Seidler, who assumed the TYLA
presidency at the annual State Bar
Convention in Dallas, points out
that most TYLA projects are geared
to the public and that through these
projects, attorneys are able to serve
the clients they represent.
"The TYLA is an influential orga-
nization," says Seidler. "Its projects
are organized efforts by attorneys to
do something for the public."
Seidler hopes that during his year
as president of TYLA, more attor-
neys will become involved in the
State Bar.
"State Bar services are available
to all attorneys," says Seidler. "All
the work is done at the local level
and I would like to see more attor-
neys active at that level."
Seidler is a partner in the Aransas
Pass law firm of Ellis, Andrews, &
Lawrence, Inc.
He earned his B.A. at the Univer-
sity of New Mexico in 1973 and his
J.D. from Texas Tech University
School of Law in 1976. He was presi-
dent of Delta Theta Phi legal frater-
nity.
Seidler has served on the TYLA
Board of Directors, and as TYLA
vice president and president-elect.
He served as president of the San
Patricio County Bar association in
1983. He is also a member of the San
Patricio County Bar Association in
Association, Nueces County Bar
Association, and Young Lawyers
Association.
He was listed in Outstanding
Young Men in America in 1982.
Seidler and his wife, Karen, have
two sons, Bradley David and Mat-
thew Kennedy.
Working with Seidler this year
will be Robert "Doc" Watson, who
was elected chairman of the board;
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David and Karen Seidler
James Nelson, vice president;
William "Bill" Ford, secretary; and
J. Keaton Grubbs, treasurer.
Watson, a partner in the Waco
law firm of Sheehy, Lovelace &
Mayfield, P.C., is board certified in
commercial and residential real
estate law.
He earned his B.A. from Baylor
University and his J.D. from Baylor
Law School.
As a TYLA director, Watson has
chaired the Local Affiliates, Bylaws
Revision and Award of Achieve-
ment Committees. He has served on
numerous other TYLA committees.
Watson is past president of the
Waco-McLennan County Young
Lawyers Association. He was
selected Outstanding Young Lawyer
of Waco-McLennan County in
1983.
Watson and his wife, Kay, have
two daughters, Allison and Melissa,
and a son, Ryan.
James Nelson is a partner in the
Odessa law firm of Shafer, Gilli-
land, Davis, McCollum & Ashley.
He attended Texas Christian Uni-
versity and the University of Texas
at Arlington. He earned his J.D.
from Texas Tech School of Law in
1976.
He was appointed TYLA director
in 1983 and co-chaired the Newslet-
ter Committee in 1984-85. He also
chaired the Law Day Committee
and served on the State Bar
Activities Planning Committee.
Nelson was elected to the Board of
Trustees of the Ector County Inde-
pendent School District.
He and his wife, Karen, have
three sons, Kyle, Jeff, and Cliff.
William "Bill" Ford is an associate
in the San Antonio firm of Groce,
Locke & Hebdon. He works pri-
marily in the areas of family law and
civil litigation.
Ford earned his B.A. from Baylor
University and his J.D. from South
Texas College of Law.
As a TYLA director, Ford co-
chaired the TYLA Moot Court
Committee and Marketing Commit-
tee. He is a member of the San
Antonio Young Lawyers Associa-
tion and has served as director, trea-
surer and chairman of several
committees.
Ford and his wife, Deborah, have
two children, Meredith and Garrett.
J. Keaton Grubbs is a partner in
the Wichita Falls law firm of Gibson
& Hotchkiss.
Grubbs earned an M.B.A. in
management from Texas Tech Uni-
versity and a J.D. from Texas Tech
School of Law.
As a TYLA director, Grubbs
chaired several committees. He will
serve as president of the Wichita
County Bar Association during
1985-86.
He is a member of the Texas Bank-
ers Association and Texas Trial
Lawyers Association.
Grubbs and his wife, Debbie,
have three children, John III, Gin-
ger, and Jana.
Kenneth C. Raney, Jr. will serve
as president-elect of TYLA. Raney,
a private practitioner in Dallas, has
served as director, secretary, and
vice president of TYLA.
He earned a bachelor's degree in
journalism from the University of
Texas in 1974 and his J.D. from
South Texas College of Law in 1977.
He and his wife, Carolyn, have
two children, Katherine Claire, and
Kenneth C. Raney, III.
TYLA OFFICERS: 1985-86 officers
elected to lead TYLA include (above) Jim
Nelson, vice president; David Seidler,
president; and Robert A. Watson, chair-
man of the board. William Ford (left)
serves as TYLA secretary. President-elect
is Kenneth C. Raney, Jr., (below, left) and
1. Keaton Grubbs (below, right) serves as
treasurer. All attorneys 36 years of age or
younger or in their first three years of prac-
tice are members of the Texas Young Law-
yers Association.
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TYLA/News
Local Winners Nominated
For Outstanding Young Lawyer
Of Texas Award
Each year, TYLA presents an award to the outstanding
young lawyer of Texas for exemplified professional profi-
ciency, service to the profession and to the community. Local
affiliates present awards at the local level and nominate their
winner for the statewide award. The following local winners
were nominated for the award:
Taylor S. Boone
San Antonio
The San Antonio Young Lawyers Association
awarded Taylor S. Boone the Outstanding Young Law-
yer Award.
Boone is an associate with Oppenheimer, Rosenberg,
Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc. and a Certified Public
Accountant.
He serves on the board of directors for the Alamo
Chapter of the American Diabetes Association. Boone
chairs the United Way Allocations Committee is a mem-
ber of the advisory council of Boysville and a trustee of
the Laurel Heights United Methodist Church. He is on the
board of the Chamber Opera and St. Mary's University
Law Alumni Association.
Boone served as chairman of the committee for coop-
eration with attorneys for the San Antonio Chapter of
the Society of C.P.A.'s.
Linda L. Addison
Houston
Linda L. Addison, a first generation American who is a
trial partner in the firm of Fulbright & Jaworski, was
selected as the Outstanding Young Lawyer by the
Houston Young Lawyers Association.
Addison is the chairman of the Houston Bar Associa-
tion Continuing Legal Education Committee and
received the President's Award for Outstanding Service
in 1981-82. She served on the TYLA Board of Directors
during 1981-83 and headed the Federal Practice Commit-
tee Written Materials and the Long Range Planning Com-
mittee.
Addison is a Fellow of the Texas Bar Foundation. She
is active in civic organizations including Books for Tex-
ans and serves on the board of advisors for the Mission
Task Force of the Centennial Presidents Associates for
the University of Texas.
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Craig T. Enoch, judge of the 101st District Court in
Dallas, is the Dallas selection for Outstanding Young
Lawyer.
Enoch was appointed to the bench by Gov. William
Clements in 1981 and was then elected to the position.
During 1977-81, he was a partner in the firm of Moseley,
Jones, Allen & Fuquay.
Enoch serves on the TYLA Judicial Administration
Subcommittee. He served as a director of the Dallas Bar
Association and is a member of the Commercial Law
League of America.
Enoch is a member of the Kiwanis Club, Canterbury
House, Boy Scouts of America, Association of Children




Henry Cuellar, a partner in the firm of Zaffirini, Cuellar
& Castillo was selected by the Laredo Bar Association as
Outstanding Young Lawyer.
Cuellar is an adjunct professor of International Com-
mercial Law in the Masters Program for International
Trade at Laredo State University and a part-time instruc-
tor at Laredo Junior College.
He is a licensed U.S. Customhouse broker. Cuellar is
active in the Laredo Legal Aid Society, Inc., Laredo
Volunteer Lawyers Program, Inc., the United Way,
International Good Neighbor Council, Kiwanis Club
and Stop Child Abuse and Neglect.
Rodney S. (Rod) Goble
Waco/McLennan County
Rodney S. (Ron) Goble was selected Outstanding
Young Lawyer by the Waco/McLennan County Young
Lawyers Association.
Goble, a partner in Estes & Goble, is a certified crimi-
nal lawyer. He is a member of the Texas Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association.
Goble serves on the board of directors of the Waco/
McLennan County Young Lawyers Association. He is on
the H.O.T. Council of Governors of the Alcohol
Advisory Commitee.
Goble is a member of the Baylor-Waco Foundation,
United Way, Masonic Lodge, and Northwest Waco
Rotary Club. In 1976, he received the Jaycees Outstand-
ing Young Man in America Award.
James C. Gordon
Abilene
James C. Gordon, a partner in the firm of McMahon,
Smart, Surovik, Suttle, Buhrmann & Cobb, was selected
Outstanding Young Lawyer by the Abilene Young Law-
yers Association.
Gordon has served as chairman of the Public Service to
Abilene State School Committee of the Abilene Young
Lawyers Association. He also serves on the TYLA Texas
Law for the Texas Law and Clergy Committee.
He is a member of the Volunteer Council of the Abilene
State School, Abilene Civil Service Commission, Citizen
Energy Council, Taylor County Child Protective Service




Richard Harrison, a partner in the firm of Henderson,
Bryant & Wolfe, is the Outstanding Young Lawyer of
Grayson County.
Harrison is board certified in civil trial law and per-
sonal injury litigation. He has served as TYLA director,
president of the Grayson County Bar Association and the
North Texas Bar Association. He was named the 1983
Outstanding Young Citizen of Sherman and is active in
the Sherman Jaycees, Sherman Community Players,
Legal Exploring Post and the Boy Scouts of America.
Harrison also offers pre-law internships to under-
graduate students at his law firm. He headed a committee
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Todd A. Hunter, an associate and member of the
litigation section of Kleberg, Dyer, Redford & Weil, was
selected Outstanding Young Lawyer by the Nueces
County Bar Association.
Hunter, board certified in civil trial law, has served as
president and treasurer of the Nueces County Young
Lawyers Association. He is vice president of the Nueces
County Bar Association and a faculty member of the
National Institute of Trial Advocacy of the American Bar
Association.
Hunter is a member of the board of directors of the
Corpus Christi Chamber of Commerce, Corpus Christi
Issues Council, United Way, Rotary Club, YWCA
Fundraising Board and is chairman of the Task Force on
Government/ Charter Revision for Corpus Christi.
William M. Schur
Fort Worth
William M. Schur, a partner in Wynnj Brown, Mack,
Renfro & Thompson, was selected by the Tarrant
County Young Lawyers Association to receive the Out-
standing Young Lawyer Award.
Schur serves as vice chairman and executive commit-





member of the State Bar of Texas District 7 Committee
on Admissions, and Court Costs, Efficiency and Delay
Committee. Schur is a member of the Tarrant County
Bar Association, Family Law Bar Association, Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America and Texas Trial Law-
yers Association.
He is active in the Mental Health Association of Tar-
rant County, Child Custody Center, Trinity Mental
Health, Celtic Soccer Club and the Special Committee of




Bert W. Pluyman, a member in the firm of Pluyman &
Bayer, was selected Outstanding Young Lawyer by the
Austin Young Lawyers Association.
Pluyman is a Fellow of the Texas Bar Foundation, a
former director of TYLA, associate director of the Texas
Trial Lawyers Association, past president of the Austin
Young Lawyers Association and ex-officio director of the
Travis County Bar Association.
Pluyman is listed as the youngest civil trial lawyer in
the country of the 730 listed in the Best Lawyers in
America.
He is active in the Travis County Association for the
Blind, Austin Lawyers Care, Lions Club and is a Labor
Grievance Arbitrator.
THE WAYTO STOP IT
IS TO BECOME UNITED.
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Local Affiliate Nomina tions:
Liberty Bell Award
The Liberty Bell Award is presented annually to an outstanding lay person
who has made the most selfless contribution to his or her community which
strengthens the effectiveness of the American system of justice. The following
nominees were given the Liberty Bell Award at the local level and recom-
mended by the local affiliate for the statewide award.
Eugene F. Jud
Waco/McLennan County
Eugene F. (Gene) Jud was recognized by the Waco
McLennan County Young Lawyers Association for his
work with Caritas of Waco. He was presented the Liberty
Bell Award by the Association.
Eight years ago, Jud left retirement to rebuild and lead
Caritas of Waco, a local charitable organization dedi-
cated to pulling together local churches, businesses and
individuals to care for the needs of the poor in Central
Texas.
Jud is executive director of Caritas of Waco and has
kept the administrative costs of the program to less than
five percent of the Caritas budget. Jud feels the com-
munity must step forward to take care of its own.
He has served on numerous committees of civic orga-
nizations including the Red Cross, Waco Youth Commis-
sion, United Fund, Waco Council for Social Welfare,
ACTION Committee and the Waco Conference of Chris-
tians and Jews.
In their application for the state-wide Liberty Bell
award the Waco/McLennan County Young Lawyers
commented that Jud has "helped develop the potential of
the individual, and the participation of the handicapped
and less privileged. He has taken unpopular stands on
behalf of black civil rights, but always in a quiet manner




H. Ross Perot, chairman of the board of Dallas-based
Electronic Data Systems Corp. and member of the board
of directors of General Motors Corp. in Detroit, was
presented the Liberty Bell Award by the Dallas Associa-
tion of Young Lawyers.
Most recently, Perot is recognized for his efforts in
heading up the Select Committee on Public Education.
As a result of the committee's recommendations, the
Texas Legislature passed a public education reform bill
during a special session in 1984.
In 1981, Perot was appointed chairman of a committee
to make Texas the least desirable state for illegal drugs.
Five bills toward this end were passed by the Texas
Legislature.
Perot was awarded the Defense Medal of Dis-
tinguished Public Service in 1979 for his efforts to change
the treatment of U.S. Prisoners of War in Vietnam.
In their application to TYLA, the DAYL recognized
Perot for "the time and money he has spent to promote




Benjamin F. Kelly is the Liberty Bell Award winner
from Tom Green County. Kelly was given the award
because he has "furthered the cause of liberty and justice
for all citizens of San Angelo as much as any resident in
Tom Green County."
Kelly is the executive director of the Boys Club of San
Angelo.
He was the first black athlete to play football at an all
white college, San Angelo State. Kelly played profes-
sional football with the San Francisco 49er's and the New
York Giants before returning to San Angelo as director of
the West Side Boys Club in 1967.
In his positions with the Boys Club, Kelly emphasizes
building the mind as well as the body. He has also been
involved in educating and counseling youth about the
dangers of drug abuse.
The mayor of San Angelo proclaimed Dec. 2, 1983 as
"Ben Kelly Appreciation Day."




Brad Jackson, assistant vice president of the Union
National Bank, was presented the Liberty Bell Award by
the Laredo Young Lawyers Association.
Jackson has served on the board of directors of the
Laredo Chamber of Commerce for 12 years and is cur-
rently vice president of the Laredo International Fair and
Exposition and secretary-treasurer of the Washington's
Birthday Celebration Association. He is past president of
the Laredo Jaycees, Laredo Noon Lions Club and the
South Texas Funeral Directors Association.
Jackson is a block leader for the United Way and was
presented a Gold Award for his efforts. He serves as a
peer counselor for a drug and alcohol abuse program.
H.C. (Clair) Brillhart, Jr.
Northeast Panhandle
H. C. (Clair) Brillhart, Jr., a rancher, was selected for the
Liberty Bell Award by the Northeast Panhandle Bar
Association.
Brill and his wife were selected Citizen Couple of the
Year in 1967. In 1985, he received the Bobby Githens
Memorial Award.
Brillhart is a community leader who is active in the
Kiwanis Club, Perryton Industrial Foundation,
Ochiltree General Hospital Board of Directors, Ochiltree
Chamber of Commerce and First United Methodist
Church. He is president of the Ochiltree Development




Kenneth McKinney, a retired certified public accoun-
tant in Houston, was awarded the Liberty Bell Award by
the Houston Young Lawyers Association for his work in
fostering respect for law enforcement officers.
McKinney authored and produced two audio-visual
presentations called "The Law is Ours" and "Just a Cop."
The audio-visuals are shown to schools and local organi-
zations. The presentations were produced in cooperation
with the Kiwanis Club of Houston to reinforce, encour-
age and educate the public on its dependence on the law,
its agencies and agents.
McKinney received distinguished service awards from
the Galveston Junior Chamber of Commerce and was
named the Outstanding Senior Citizen of Galveston in
1965. In 1981, he was nominated for the Freedom Foun-




Raul Jimenez, Sr., president and chairman of the board
of the Jimenez Food Products, Inc., was selected for the
Liberty Bell Award by the San Antonio Young Lawyers
Association.
The Jimenez Annual Thanksgiving Dinner, Inc. is a
non-profit organization that has fed about 50,000 senior
citizens since the program began in Fort Worth in 1974.
The San Antonio program began in 1980.
Jimenez is active in working to improve the commu-
nity. He has worked for adult education schools and
advanced parent/child education programs.
In 1984, the Jimenez family cooperated with the City of
San Antonio, United San Antonio, World Class Wres-
tling, and the San Antonio and the Mexican Chambers of
Commerce to coordinate the Thanksgiving Dinner.




The Abilene Young Lawyers Association presented
Fred Lee Hughes, vice-chairman of InterFirst Bank of
Abilene, the Liberty Bell Award.
In 1982, Hughes was selected as the second most influ-
ential citizen in Abilene in an Abilene Reporter News
poll.
He served on the Abilene City Council and as mayor of
the city. As mayor, Hughes emphasized the importance
of law and the constitution with acitivities such as Law
Day, Constitution Week, Respect the Law Week and
Crime Prevention Week. Hughes is also recognized for
his belief in the youth of the city.
He has served as liaison between the city of Abilene
and Dyess Air Force Base, on the board of Citizens for
Better Government, the Hendricks Home Development
Council and has participated in various other civic
activities.
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Liberty and Justice for All:
TYLA Law Day Activities, 1985
By Kathryn Snapka
TYLA affiliates throughout the state participated in
Law Day activities based upon the 1985 theme for Law
Day, "Liberty and Justice for All." Emphasis as always
was on increasing public awareness of law and the legal
profession, however there were several outstanding
examples of an intense focus for this year's activities on
disseminating information to students in public schools.
Throughout the state, young lawyers spoke in junior
high and high school civic classes and answered ques-
tions regarding law and the legal profession. In Houston,
there was an essay contest based on the 1985 Law Day
theme. In Nueces County, several mock trials involving
young lawyers and the students were held in high schools
throughout the city. To give the students a close-up look
at courtroom procedures, young lawyer associations in
several cities conducted courthouse tours.
This year, as in years past, young lawyers in coopera-
tion with bar associations, sponsored the popular "Call-
A-Lawyer" and "Ask-A-Lawyer" programs. These pro-
grams offer the public an opportunity to ask general
questions of law that can be answered over local radio or
television stations. In some cities, young lawyers man-
ned booths in shopping centers to answer questions that
individuals might have but would not normally turn to a
lawyer for assistance.
And of course, for lawyers, numerous luncheons, ban-
quets and gatherings were sponsored by local young
lawyer associations for speeches and award presenta-
tions.
Perhaps the most interesting facet of this Law Day, is
that at the time of this writing programs at schools all
over the state, mock trials and requests for speeches by
young lawyers are still being received. This may be the
greatest measure of the success of the Law Day program:
genuine interest in the law, the legal profession and how
it affects all of us not only on May 1 but all year.
TYLA Awards of Achievement
Each year, the Texas Young Lawyers Association recognizes
local affiliates for their individual projects and comprehensive
programs. The local projects are then entered in the ABA competi-
tion. Local affiliates receiving recognition from TYLA this year
included:
Comprehensive:
Large City: Small City:
First - Waco/McLennan County
Second - Abilene
Third - Nueces County
Fourth - Jefferson County
Single Project Awards:
Large City:
First: San Antonio - Bexar County Community
Service Restitution Project, a probation
program for first offenders to do commu-
nity work.
Second: Austin - Dispute Mediation Center of
Travis County.
Third: Houston - "A Day in Court," an oppor-
tunity for high school students to view an
actual trial and tour a jail.
Fourth: Dallas - Mock trial training videotape for
high school students.
Fifth: Fort Worth - Federal Civil Practice and
Procedure Seminar and videotape.
Small City:
First: Waco/McLennan County - "Hear ye ...
Hear ye, Order in the Court," a court clinic
for participants in high school mock trial
competitions.
Second: Abilene - "Point of Law," videotapes
showing attorneys answering questions
from "You and the Law" for use on televi-
sion.
Third: Nueces County - Television "Public Ser-
vice Announcements" for Pro Bono ser-
vices offered by attorneys.








Just When You Thought it Was Safe ...
Just when you thought you were sensitive to the '80's
- women's rights, gay rights, and other minority rights
- you now read that you should concentrate on the
demands of consumer English. Judging from the mail
after my first column on jargon (April 1985, Texas Bar
Journal), many attorneys do not understand what the
fuss is all about. Many do not see how to avoid jargon.
"And what, pray tell, should I use instead of the words
on your April hit list?" wrote a Dallas attorney.
I have this image of a harried attorney, proud of his
research and product, reading the "hit list" he would
have retitled "These Are a Few of my Favorite Things."
To help answer his question about alternatives, I will list
some of the words (in italics) on the "hit list" that can be
eliminated entirely:
the aforesaid plaintiff
enclosed herein (and herewith)
null and void
it is hereby ordered
said defendant
Juicy Fruit, hereinafter the seller (and hereinafter
cited as)
save and except
witnesseth (a pause between identification in a con-




give, devise, and bequeath (bequeath may now
govern real property as well as personal)
in truth and in fact (Truth is distinguished from
fiction or error, and the purpose of the court will be to
prove these statements, so the fact will determine the
actual occurance anyway.)
be it remembered and know all men by these pres-
ents
whereas to introduce recitals ("Whereas, no one
reads this part anyway...")
in lieu, in place, instead of, and in substitution for
have and hold (old common law for conveyance)
last will and testament (A will now relates to both
real and personal property, unlike early English law
which separated them. Many attorneys express
serious discomfort changing the names of legal docu-
ments, so I doubt this redundancy will ever die.)
annual and set aside (imbalance of phraseology.
"Annul" is one option of setting aside, and would
mean the same thing without the unnecessary words.
However, to set aside can mean a variety of things: to"reverse, vacate, cancel, annul, or review." So if you
are describing the action of a court, you might qualify
how the court set aside the ruling by adding, for
example, that the court set aside the opinion for
review. Another option might be that an appellate
court will set aside its decision by reversing it, or
cancelling it.)
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Other jargon words from the "hit list" have simple or
more modern substitutes. None of the words below is
"incorrect," but the cumulative effect of these words in a
document, designed for either a client or another
attorney, cloys as unnecessary baggage.
aforesaid (above)
forthwith (immediately)
heretofore (before, up to this time)
thenceforth (thereafter, after that)
to wit (namely, that is to say)
behoove (to be advantageous, or to be proper)
henceforth (from now on)
whence (from where, or from what place)
A second group of words from the "hit list" may not be
synonymous, but they need to be reconsidered. The
coupled words below are not parallel or equal, in spite of
the conjunction that signals they will be. For example,
fraud and deceit is frequently written as a phrase, joined
by the conjunction "and." But fraud is a cause of action
that contains the element of deceit, along with other
elements (the purpose of inducing another to part with a
valuable thing or legal right). If you have committed
fraud, you have deceived; that is a conditional rela-
tionship rather than a conjunctive one. The combined
phrase is repetitious. Fraud is merely one aspect of deceit.
While an element of fraud, deceit is also an element of
other causes of action. Deceit is also deceptive misrepre-
sentation that does not lead to any cause of action.
Parents lying to their children about Santa Claus deceive
them, but they are not quilty of breaking any law. If you
have defrauded someone, you have necessarily deceived
her. But if you have deceived someone, you have not
necessarily defrauded her. The phrase is used incorrectly
if the two words are joined by a conjunction that indi-
cates that the words are equals. If they are related at all,
one (deceit) is a subordinate rather than an equal.
Another coupled phrase, acknowledge and confess,
contains an internal redundancy. To acknowledge is
defined as "to own, avow, or admit; to confess; to recog-
nize one's acts and assume responsibility." So the defini-
tion contains "confess." Acknowledge is the larger
entity, and confession is one of the aspects of it. They are
not parallel and equal.
Due and payable has the same problem; both mean
that justice or the law requires something owing, pay-
able. In this case, though, payable may signify an obliga-
tion to pay at once, so it subsumes due within this phrase
and becomes redundant. Play it safe and drop one of the
terms.
I suspect that consumer English is here to stay. After
the initial development of other social reforms of this
decade and the natural reactions against them, an equi-
librium has developed with far more respect for other
people's interests. Consumer English is a response to the
years that people have felt powerless against, and
unnecessarily ignorant of, legalese in documents that
control their lives. Texas attorneys who want to keep
their clients should write - and edit - with their clients'
interests in mind; waiting for the Texas Legislature or bar
associations to edit consumer documents is like waiting
for Godot. If your professional judgment is that a con-
tract or will must be couched in careful language required
by courts, then the least that a conscientious attorney can
do for clients - the ones who pay the bills is to
provide an accompanying summary that the clients can
understand.
Last week an attorney shared his favorite office anec-
dote. He had written to a client using clean, clear prose.
Later, the client called back and chewed him out, saying
he did not expect to receive a letter written by the office
secretary. When the attorney insisted that he had done
the actual writing, the client grumbled, "Well, it sure
didn't sound like a lawyer."
If you consider the years of indoctrination that led to
that accusation, you will accept that no one person can
change the public's perception of legal writing. But each
of you can make a conscious effort, while dictating or
filling in forms, to balance your need for speed with your
client's need to understand what you have said. And
change will occur.
We are only halfway through the '80's....
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